arguments which may be urged to the contrary. On no point is public opinion so unanimous. The German people consider it an absolutely unquestionable matter of honour to keep a firm hold of Belgium.

From the political and military standpoints it is obvious that, were this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor less than a basis from which England could attack and most dangerously menace Germany—in short, a shield behind which our foes would again assemble against us. Economically Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

Belgium may also bring us a considerable addition to our population, if in course of time the Flemish element, which is so closely allied to us, becomes emancipated from the artificial grip of French culture and remembers its Teutonic affinities.

As to the problems which we shall have to solve, once we possess Belgium, we would here confine ourselves to emphasising the following principles:—(1) The inhabitants must be precluded from exercising any political influence whatever in the Empire; and (2) the most important business undertakings and estates (as in the districts to be ceded by France) must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands.

3. RUSSIA.—On our Eastern frontier the population of the Russian Empire is increasing on an enormous scale—about 2-½ to 3 millions yearly. Within a generation a population of 250 millions will be attained. Against this overwhelming pressure of numbers on our eastern flank, undoubtedly the greatest danger to the German and European future, Germany can hold her ground only—(a) if a strong boundary-wall be erected both against the advancing tide of Russification, which encroaches imperceptibly in times of peace, and also against the menace of an aggressive war; and (b) if we adopt all possible measures to maintain the past healthy increase of our population. But the realisation of both these conditions demands land, which Russia must cede to us. It must be agricultural land for colonisation—land which will yield us healthy peasants, the rejuvenating source of all national and political energy; land which can take up part of the increase of our population, and offer to the returning German emigrants, who wish to turn their backs on hostile foreign countries, a new home in their own country; land which will increase Germany's economic independence of foreign countries, by developing her own possibilities of food-production, which will constitute the necessary counterpoise to the advancing industrialisation of our people and the increase of town-dwellers, thus conserving that equilibrium of our economic resources, whose inestimable value has been proved during the war, and saving us from the dangerous one-sidedness of the English economic system; land which will arrest the decline of the birth-rate, check emigration, and alleviate the dearth of dwelling-houses; land whose re-settlement and Germanisation will provide new possibilities of livelihood for the professional classes also. Such land for our physical, moral, and intellectual health is to be found above all in the East.

The measure in which our Eastern frontier is to be advanced will depend on the military situation, and in particular also it should be determined by strategic considerations. As far as the rectification of the eastern frontier of Posen and Silesia and the southern frontier of East Prussia is concerned, a frontier zone, accessible to German colonisation and as far as possible free of private ownership, must be created. This German frontier zone will protect the Prussian Poles against the direct and excessive influence of Russian Poland, which will perhaps attain its independence. Moreover, in this connection, we have no hesitation whatever in drawing special attention to that ancient territory in the Russian Baltic Provinces, which has been cultivated by Germans for the last 700 years. It is sparsely populated, its soil is fruitful, and it therefore promises to have a great future as a field for colonisation, whilst its Lithuanian, Lettish, and Esthonian population is derived from a stock alien to the Russians, which may prove a reliable source of that supply of journeyman-labour which we so urgently need.

We based our demand for land for colonisation from Russia on two grounds—the need for erecting a "boundary-wall" and the need for maintaining the increase of our population. But, in the third place, land is the form in which Russia's war-indemnity ought to be paid to us. To obtain an indemnity from Russia in cash or in securities will probably be just as impossible after this war as it proved after the Russo-Japanese war. On the other hand, Russia can easily pay an indemnity in kind. Russia is excessively rich in territory, and we demand that the territory which Russia is to surrender to us in lieu of a war-indemnity shall be delivered to us for the most part free of private ownership. This is by no means an outrageous demand, if we bear in mind Russian administrative methods. The Russian population is not so firmly rooted in the soil as that of Western and Central Europe. Again and again, right up to the early days of the present war, Russia has transplanted parts of her population on an enormous scale and settled them in far distant provinces. The possibilities of the scheme here proposed must not be judged in accordance with the modest standards of German civilisation (Kultur). If the acquisition of political control over territory is to bring with it that increase of power which we so urgently need for our future, we must also obtain economic control and have in the main free disposition over it. To conclude peace with Russia without ensuring the diminution of Russian preponderance, and without acquiring those territorial acquisitions which Germany needs, would be to lose a great opportunity for promoting Germany's political, economic, and social regeneration, and to impose upon future generations the burden of the final settlement with Russia—in other words, Germany and European civilisation would be confronted with the certainty of a renewal of their life-and-death struggle.

4. ENGLAND, THE EAST, COLONIES, AND OVERSEA TRADE.—The war between us and Russia has been waged with extraordinary violence, and has led to a glorious success for our arms; and we must never forget the menace to our future presented by the enormous Russian mass encamped on our Eastern frontier, if we should fail to disintegrate it. Nevertheless, we must never for one moment lose sight of the fact that this war is, in its ultimate origin, England's war upon the foreign trade, the naval power, and the world-prestige of Germany.

Since this is the motive of England's hostility and war against us, our war-aims against England are clear. We must wrest a free field for our foreign trade, we must enforce the recognition of our naval power and our world-prestige in spite of England.

We admit that England has taught us one lesson by her blockade, which has compelled Germany to reorganise herself for the duration of this war as a self-contained industrial state; for we have learned that, before and above all, we must win and secure a wider territorial basis in Europe (as is explained in detail above), in order that we may stand before the world in the utmost possible political, military and economic independence. And we must also create on the Continent the widest possible sphere of economic interest, directly contiguous with our country's frontiers (i.e. avoiding sea-routes), so as to free ourselves as far as possible from dependence upon the good pleasure of England and of the other world-empires, whose self-sufficiency and