ratification decided in open session of the Senate,” Mr. Sumner said:—

From the beginning I have always held that the Senate erred in the establishment of secrecy, particularly with reference to treaties. I think the first year that I had the honor of a seat in the Senate the question of a change of our rule in that regard was presented, and I voted in its favor. I have seen nothing from that day to this to change my judgment upon that particular point materially. I think that the rule of secrecy was a traditional policy which we derived from the diplomatic usages of the Old World. We came to it naturally, and it has continued with us down to this day. Now, personally, I incline to change it; but I have two suggestions to present, applicable to the pending question. The first is, whether it is advisable to change it while it is known that an important treaty is actually pending; whether the change, if such change should be adopted by the Senate, should not be applicable to the future rather than to any pending question. I merely present that, without undertaking to determine it. The other point is, whether a change so important, not to say so radical, whatever may be the judgment of individual Senators, like the Senator from Connecticut, or like myself, should not be referred to the committee having charge of such questions. I would therefore suggest that the proposition be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. That committee will meet next Tuesday, and I have no doubt will take it at once into consideration.

ELIGIBILITY TO THE SENATE: QUESTION OF INHABITANCY.

Remarks in the Senate, on the Admission of General Adelbert Ames as a Senator of Mississippi, April 1, 1870.

MR. PRESIDENT,—I hesitate to say a word in this debate. The question has been exhausted on both sides, and to me, I must be pardoned for saying, it is infinitely plain. It is plain in law; it is plain in fact. When I say it is plain in law, I believe all the Senate on both sides will concur,—for, indeed, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Thurman] stated the law precisely as I understand it.

We all know that in topography there are what are called water-sheds, sometimes high, sometimes low, and from these elevations flow in opposite directions the currents which there find their fountains. Sir, the water-shed of this debate is found in the intent; and this water-shed may be high or low. Suffice it that it is a water-shed; this is enough. Suffice it that the intent appears; and this is all that is required, in order to determine the character of the residence. Show me a citizen actually in a State, then the intent to remain fixes his inhabitancy.

The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Trumbull] substantially admitted this rule of law. I agree with him that there are but two things to be shown: first, what the old books call the factum, and, secondly, what the same old books call the animus. What is the factum? It is residence. What is the animus? It is intent to stay. Now in point of law you can add nothing to these. You may argue till doomsday, you may cite authorities without number, but you can add nothing to these two simple requirements, residence and intent.

Mr. Sumner. Certainly.

Mr. Sumner. Very well,—I will come to that. The Senator and myself agree that in point of law there are two things to be established, and only two,—residence and intent. The question that remains is one of evidence; it is not a question of law. If the Senator were on the bench, which he once adorned, he would be obliged to charge the jury in this way. The rule of law is positive. All that remains comes under the head of evidence. Now I say by law you must show those two things, residence and intent, and you cannot add to either a tittle.

On this occasion, the most important requirement is that of intent. This is the requirement that has been most argued. And here I go back to that original Latin phrase which dominates this case, and which is in itself an all-sufficient rule: I mean the animus manendi. Why is this phrase, so often repeated, handed down for successive centuries? Simply because, like maxims of law, or like proverbs, it contains in one short phrase a rule. You have there a chapter of jurisprudence, if you please, or a volume. It is the mind, or the intent to remain, which governs. This is all that the law says. The law does not go forward and require, as the Senator from Illinois has argued to-day, that there must be an act. You find no such requirement in the rule. The rule is explicit, precise; and here I challenge contradiction. It is simply the intent to remain, the animus manendi. Step beyond that and you are lost, if you undertake to state the law. There is no rule of law outside of this simple sum-total.

I come, then, to the point that we have before us, simply a question of intent. I might cite authorities here. I have some of them before me. I will read one. For instance, here is Vattel, quoted by Judge Story in his article on Domicile in the “Encyclopædia Americana,” which Senators familiar with this subject know is of authority:—

On this Judge Story very properly remarks:—

Here are words completely applicable to the case now before us. The learned author then proceeds to say:—

And then adds:—

Mark the old recurring phrase, with its light and limitation. Here again I say is the rule. You cannot go outside of it. If you go outside of it, you are lost. I am speaking of the rule of law. I know that there can be